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Abstract 
 
We analyze the Spanish temporary workers’ transitions into permanent employment and 
to what extent those who become unemployed are able to achieve a permanent job. Our 
focus is placed on the role of the individual’s sequence of temporary contracts on the 
probability of moving from temporary into permanent employment. We apply multiple-
spell duration techniques to a longitudinal dataset of temporary workers obtained from 
Social Security records for the period 1996-2003. We basically find that even though 
transitions into permanent employment increase with tenure, temporary jobs do not 
constitute stepping stones towards permanent employment, since the probability of 
obtaining a permanent job decreases with repeated temporary jobs. Results also show 
that individuals with high duration of unemployment flow into permanent work less 
frequently. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the mid-eighties, in order to fight against the high and persistent levels of 
unemployment, Spain enhanced the flexibility of its labor market by allowing 
employers to hire workers on a fixed-term basis. The main purpose of the new 
legislation was to lower layoff and discharge costs and thereby address the high 
unemployment rate by promoting hiring. The implications of increased job flexibility 
have been particularly acute in this country, where deregulation of temporary 
employment was undertaken without modifying the employment regulation of 
permanent workers (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Lower dismissals costs, and 
sometimes wages, under temporary contracts favoured employers’ hiring of workers on 
fixed-term contracts1. As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in 
the mid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. Nowadays almost 91% of all 
new registered employment contracts are temporary in Spain (García-Pérez and Muñoz-
Bullón, 2005a). 
 
In this paper, we examine the dynamics of temporary workers’ transitions to other labor 
force states. In particular, we analyze the extent to which temporary work facilitates the 
movement into regular (or permanent) work. The analysis is particularly important in 
Spain, where there is a general consensus that reduced wages, job stability, and 
advancement opportunities for temporary workers has promoted a class of secondary 
workers who can be best characterized as involuntary and permanently employed on a 
temporary basis (Segura et al., 1991; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Alba-Ramírez, 1997; 
Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000). In particular, the growth of temporary employment has raised 
many concerns regarding its capacity to act as a springboard towards permanent 
employment (Booth et al., 2002a). Thus, an important aspect of the use of temporary 
contracts is their pattern of promotion into regular contracts of indefinite duration. If at 
least some individuals holding temporary contracts are able to reduce their duration 
until regular work, then it may be sensible to stimulate the use of temporary work 
among such a group. On the contrary, if Spanish temporary employment displays few 
opportunities for advancement, targeted policy action is called for. The relevance of this 
issue from a policy point of view lies not only on the fact that policy makers and labour 
market analysts have become increasingly concerned about the growth of temporary 
employment in Europe2, but also on the fact that Spain represents an extreme experience 
in several labor market dimensions, such as its rate of unemployment, its employment 
protection legislation and its rate of temporary workers (see, in this respect, Güell and 
Petrongolo, 2007).  
 
We use a longitudinal administrative data source which tracks the labor careers of 
workers whose initial contract was temporary in 1996 up to the year 2003. The 
empirical analysis is carried out separately for workers in three different occupational 
levels (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled positions).  We estimate a multiple-spell 
hazard model with competing risks. The model specifies the transition rates from 
temporary employment into unemployment, temporary or permanent employment, and 
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also from unemployment into temporary versus permanent employment. Each transition 
rate is allowed to depend on observed and unobserved explanatory variables as well as 
on elapsed time spent in the current state3. Our results suggest that temporary work is 
more likely to become a trap than a bridge to permanent employment. In particular, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important in order to obtain clear estimates. 
 
The analysis of the effect of repeated temporary contracts on the probability to find a 
permanent job has been the subject of several studies. For instance, Van Ours (2004) 
investigates locking-in effects of temporary subsidized jobs through a natural 
experiment in the Slovak labor market in the nineties. Booth et al. (2002b) study the 
labor market prospects of temporary workers in the UK (where temps represent 7% of 
male employees and 10% of female employees). Their results show that temporary 
employment is associated with lower wages, less specific training and lower job 
satisfaction in respect to permanent employment, though it is not associated with 
negative trajectories. Zijl et. al (2004), using a multi-state model and, applying the “time 
of events” approach, find that temporary jobs serve as stepping stones towards regular 
employment. Finally, Gagliarducci (2005) show evidence for the Italian labor market 
indicating that the probability of moving into regular employment decreases with job 
interruptions. 
 
However, up to our knowledge, for Spain there are only a few studies on the transitions 
between temporary and permanent employment. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes (2001) 
examines the determinants of Spanish conversions of temporary contracts into 
permanent ones using information on the composition of employment at the firm level. 
She finds that dismissal costs hardly affect contract conversions, which mostly respond 
to employment expectations and union pressure for increased employment stability. 
Most existing studies on the determinants of individual conversion rates use logit 
specifications (Toharia 1996, and Alba-Ramírez, 1998), which may be not very flexible 
when applied to the analysis of the dynamic path of transition rates. To our knowledge, 
duration studies on Spanish conversion rates are that of Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Güell 
and Petrongolo (2007) and Casquel and Cunyat (2005)4. Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) 
estimates transitions out of temporary employment using the Labor Force Survey and 
finds that conversion rates are very low, regardless of job tenure. Güell and Petrongolo 
(2007) use the same dataset to study the time pattern of permanent employment; they 
find that estimates deliver clear spikes at the legal limit, that higher conversion rates 
occur in cases where workers supposedly have higher outside options, and that 
conversion rates of temporary into permanent contracts increase with tenure. Finally, 
Casquel and Cunyat (2005) analyze whether the existence of observable and 
unobservable characteristics influences the transition rate to a permanent employment 
and conclude that in Spain temporary contracts do not play this role. 
 
                                                 
3
 Among the advantages of analyzing the dynamics of temporary and non-employment spells is that 
multi-spell data greatly facilitates the identification and estimation of the joint distribution of the 
unobserved heterogeneity variables (see Honoré, 1993, and van den Berg, 2001) 
4
 García-Serrano (2004) also analyses whether workers with temporary contracts induces them to present 
a high employment exit rate. With the living and working conditions database (Encuesta de Calidad de 
Vida en el Trabajo) for the year 2001, he concludes that individuals under temporary contracts suffer 
worse labour conditions and face a greater employment exit rate, especially those with tenure lower than 
18 months. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish institutional 
framework. Section 3 briefly presents the hypotheses under examination. Section 4 
describes the data used. Section 5 presents the empirical model and its main results. We 
conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. The institutional framework 
 
Before 1984, Spanish legislation on labor contracts (contained in the Workers’ Statute 
of 1980) assumed every contract to be an open-ended contract as a general case, 
whereas temporary contracts were intended to be used only for jobs whose nature were 
temporary (seasonal jobs, temporary substitution of permanent workers, etc). In 1984, 
however, the Spanish government introduced the first reform designed to reduce 
dismissal costs —since then, they require lower severance payments than permanent 
contracts when the contract terminates5— and to liberalize the use of temporary 
contracts: it eliminated the requirement that the activity associated with the job were of 
temporary nature. As a result of this reform, the proportion of employees under 
temporary contracts increased from 10% during the 1980’s to over 30% in the early 
1990’s. These contracts can be signed for a period between a minimum of six months 
and a maximum of three years. After three years, the contract cannot be renewed, and 
the worker must be either fired or be offered a permanent contract by his current 
employer. In the former case, the employee cannot hire any other worker for the job. 
 
Between 1985 and 1994, over 95% of all new hires were employed through temporary 
contracts and the conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts was only 
around 10% (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). Thus, the main concern with the 
liberalization of temporary contracts after 1984 was that it generated a huge 
segmentation between unstable low-paying jobs and stable high-paying jobs, without 
appearing to reduce unemployment. 
 
Shifting direction in light of these concerns, in 1994 new regulations limited the use of 
temporary employment contracts to seasonal jobs. In addition, the 1994 reform slightly 
relaxed dismissal conditions for permanent contracts. In particular, the definition of fair 
dismissals was widened by including additional “economic reasons” for them. In 
practice, approval for dismissals under “economic reasons” continued to be granted 
mainly when there was an agreement between employers and workers and labor courts 
continued to rule most dismissals as unfair, so that dismissal costs on permanent 
contracts did not change much. 
 
In practice, however, employers continued to hire workers under temporary contracts 
for all types of jobs and not just for seasonal jobs. This perceived ineffectiveness of the 
1994 reform led to a new reform in 1997, which was eventually extended in 2001. As 
with the 1994 reform, the goal of the 1997 and 2001 reforms was to reduce the use of 
temporary contracts. It created a new type of permanent contract, with lower severance 
costs in case of unfair dismissal (33 days per year of seniority) and with fiscal 
incentives in the fist two years of the contract (i.e., reductions of employers’ payroll 
taxes). However, rather than trying to limit the use of temporary contracts by further 
possibly ineffective regulation, these new reforms increased the incentives for firms to 
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 In particular, temporary workers are entitled to 8 days per year of seniority based on the salary whereas 
permanent workers may obtain up to 45 days if dismissal is found to be unfair. 
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hire workers from certain population groups under permanent contracts6. This reform 
led to a sharp and sustained increase in the number of permanent contracts for workers 
in some of these affected groups. Finally, the 2001 reform extended the use of the new 
permanent contracts created in the 1997 reform to other groups of workers, and 
introduced a new severance payment of 8 days of wages per year of seniority in 
temporary contracts not renewed.  
 
3. Hypotheses: the transitions under examination 
 
To what extent and how does accumulating temporary jobs affect the probability of 
finding a permanent job? There are at least two reasons why temporary employment 
might represent a “springboard” to permanent employment. On the one hand, according 
to the matching approach, firms may use temporary contracts as a screening device in 
order to identify the best matches: in this case, more-able workers might signal their 
type by making themselves available for screening under temporary contracts. In this 
sense, workers who are able to find a temporary job provide a signal of their quality to 
potential employers, since being on a temporary contract means that the worker is 
willing to take a job (rather than, for instance, rely on unemployment benefits). 
Therefore, temporary job experience may be informative about the ability and 
motivation of the individual7. We would then expect that the rate of transition from a 
temporary contract to an open-ended contract would decrease as time goes by, since 
employers will use an individual’s labor market history to sort good workers from bad 
workers and they might perceive (rightly or wrongly) that a previous history of multiple 
temporary contracts is likely to result in some loss of skills.  
 
On the other hand, following the human capital approach, being employed under a 
temporary contract allows the worker the acquisition of human capital (either general or 
specific) which would positively influence the probability of acquiring a permanent 
status —in addition to social contacts and information on permanent vacancies, which 
may allow the individual to deepen his attachment to the labor market, and to search 
more effectively for more desirable jobs. Moreover, as explained in the literature on 
career interruption8, unemployment spells following terminations of temporary 
contracts would make the individual incur not only the permanent loss of firm-specific 
human capital, but also the deterioration of general skills (Gregory et al., 2001).  
 
However, temporary employment may also be a “trap” of endless precariousness 
especially as duration in the temporary contract increases. On the one hand, a temporary 
contract may also serve as a signal as to the lack of alternatives (especially in case that 
the employer believes that the temporary worker has already been screened by other 
employees). On the other hand, due to the high turnover usually associated with 
temporary work experiences, temporary work may be associated with limited 
acquisition of human capital. Finally, as search intensity for an open-ended job is 
expected to reduce with the duration in the non-permanent state, we expect the exit rate 
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 In particular, the 1997 reform reduced dismissal costs for unfair dismissals by about 25% and payroll 
taxes between 40% and 90% for newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into 
permanent contracts after the second quarter of 1997 for workers under 30 years-old, over 45 years-old, 
the long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations, and disabled workers (see, in 
this respect, Kugler et al., 2003) 
7
 Indeed, some studies have shown that employers use atypical contracts as a way of screening for 
permanent jobs (Storrie, 2002; Housman et al., 2003). 
8
 See Mincer and Ofek, 1982. 
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from a temporary to a permanent contract to be negatively associated with such 
duration. 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The sample used in this paper is drawn from the Spanish Social Security records and 
comes from two different random samples. The first sample is a one per cent of the 
population, who were either employed or unemployed on the first of January, 1990 
(77398 individuals). The second sample is another one per cent of individuals, who 
were either employed or unemployed on the 31st of December, 2003 (116990 
individuals). The data provided includes information about the complete labor market 
history of these two samples of workers. Moreover, it offers information about the age 
and gender of the workers, the occupation held9, the dates when the employment spell 
starts and ends, the reason for the termination of the spell (voluntary quit, dismissal or 
retirement), the Spanish province where the employment spell took place, an identifier 
of whether each employment spell is accomplished through a Temporary Help Agency 
or not, the type of contract held by the worker, and, finally, whether the individual is 
receiving or not unemployment benefits.  
 
From this initial dataset, given that our interest is on labor careers starting out of 
temporary contracts and that the variable collecting the type of contract is only reliable 
from the second half of the nineties, we select only individuals whose initial contract in 
1996 is a temporary one. In order to minimize the initial sample heterogeneity, we make 
another restriction: we select workers who, at the time of the initial temporary contract, 
were aged between 16 and 25 years-old. This allows us to keep a final sample of 
individuals who can be considered very similar a priori and whose following 
achievements in the labor market can then be attributed, after controlling for observable 
and unobservable heterogeneity, only to their career. We have also eliminated 
observations with missing information on any variable used. Moreover, we have 
removed workers in specific regimes like Agriculture or Self-employed workers. This 
leaves us with a sample of 20,598 individuals. 
 
There are two main advantages of using Social Security records for the analysis of labor 
careers. On the one hand, information is available on all jobs held by the individual 
during a certain interval of time; in particular, the longitudinal character of the database 
makes it possible to follow the same individuals from 1996 up to the end of 2003, and, 
therefore, to observe their career progress or decline along time. We keep every 
temporary contract in the dataset separately, allowing for workers to move from one job 
to the following one. On the other hand, we can accurately measure the duration 
between the start of a temporary job until the moment at which the individual moves to 
a permanent or a new temporary job or becomes unemployed. And, subsequently, we 
can also accurately measure the duration between the start of unemployment and the 
moment at which the individual moves into temporary or permanent employment. 
Given the scarcity of observations beyond 42 (30) months for employment 
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 The occupation indicates a level in a ranking determined by the worker’s contribution to the Social 
Security system. It is related to the individual’s qualification level, since it comprises the required 
qualification level for the job. However, it does not comprise the workers’ actual level of qualification. 
For instance, an individual working in the lowest occupation may well be in possession of a high 
academic degree (see, in this respect, García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005a, 2005b). 
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(unemployment) spells, we have treated observations beyond this duration 
(respectively) as artificially right-censored.  
 
Thus, there is only one initial state (a temporary contract, TC) and then the entry into 
subsequent spells is completely internalized. The initial spell includes individuals with 
the main types of temporary contracts: casual, work-experience (practice), per task, 
training or interim contracts10. Our analysis is separately done for three sub-samples of 
individuals, defined according to the occupation held: high, intermediate and low 
occupational groups.11 Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show the labor market states for each of 
these three groups (up to their third transition). As can be observed, there are three 
possible destination states out of the initial temporary contract: Unemployment (U), 
Temporary contract (TC) and Permanent contract (PC)12.  The transition to permanency 
allows us to test the stepping-stone hypothesis whereas the transition to other states will 
be useful to contrast whether temporary contracts are dead-end jobs by themselves. 
With respect to the exit from unemployment, there are two possible transitions: 
Temporary contract (TC) or Permanent contract (PC). Thus, those figures present five 
possible transitions: TC-U, TC-TC, TC-PC, U-TC and U-PC. We consider the PC state 
to be an absorption state, meaning that every spell after the transition to PC is removed 
from the sample. 
 
The most frequent transition out of the initial temporary contract is into unemployment, 
especially for the Low and Intermediate qualification groups. The second most 
empirically observed transition is into another temporary contract. The transition into a 
PC state positively depends on the qualification level (9.7% for the High qualification 
group, 7.8% for the medium qualification group, and 6.5% for the Low qualification 
group). Finally, transitions from temporary jobs to permanent jobs are not frequent, 
even less than transitions from unemployment to permanent employment. These 
numbers are roughly consistent with earlier findings in Spain (see Kugler et al, 2003, or 
Güell et al., 2007). As a first impression, therefore, temporary employment is unlikely 
to serve as a stepping-stone towards regular work. 
 
We are also interested on the effect of duration in a determined state (either TC or 
Unemployment) on the likelihood of attaining regular employment —and not only on 
transitions into permanent employment. For this purpose, Figures 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1 
present monthly Kaplan-Meier estimates of such transitions for each qualification group 
considered. These empirical hazard functions collect the proportion of individuals 
leaving the TC state at each moment in time, given that they have been temporarily 
employed until that moment (Lancaster, 1990). For any qualification group considered, 
the probability of exiting from temporary employment into any destination state 
declines with tenure, and (as expected from the commented-above transitions) the most 
likely aftermath of a temporary job is a period of unemployment, followed by obtaining 
a new temporary contract. Moreover, exit rates into unemployment and into another 
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 See the Appendix for definitions for each type of temporary contract. In order to know more details on 
each type of contract, see the Guía Laboral, elaborated by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 
which is freely available in the following web page: http://www.mtas.es 
11
 The specific categories within each group are detailed in the Appendix. See, for instante, García-Fontes 
and Hopenhayn (1996), García-Pérez (1997), or García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005a, 2005b), who 
use a similar classification.  
12
 In the transitions TC-TC and TC-PC, the possible unemployment period in between the two contracts 
has to be no longer than 15 days. The transition TC-U implies that the initial temporary contract finishes 
and the subsequent unemployment spell lasts for more than 15 days. 
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temporary contract are very high early in the temporary job; the former reaches the 
maximum in the Medium qualification group (31.45%) while the latter has its maximum 
in the High qualification group (18.09%). The exit rate into a permanent job is, 
however, minuscule, independently of the qualification group considered. It is 
noteworthy that the hazard rates from TC rise to peaks in months 6, 12, 24 and 36. 
These peaks show that temporary contracts are very likely to finish at each of these 
particular months. Given that no special reason can be adduced to explain why 
individuals should be dismissed at those months, these duration effects are likely due to 
temporary contract terminations, since they are usually signed for these specific 
durations. Similar results are obtained in previous studies (see, in particular, García-
Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005a, or Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).  
 
Empirical hazard rates from unemployment are shown in Figures 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2. As 
can be observed, exiting into a temporary contract is much more likely when compared 
to the alternative (permanent employment). The hazard rate into a TC is substantially 
high at the beginning of the unemployment experience, reaching levels above 10 
percent during the first eleven months (for any qualification group). It shows a peak 
around the 10th month, and falls very quickly from then on, remaining at levels slightly 
above 5 percent. However, the likelihood of entering into a regular job remains 
basically flat and shows no duration dependence. 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 1-4. Table 1 shows the types of temporary 
contracts in the sample for each qualification group considered (high, intermediate and 
low occupational groups). As can be observed, most of TC spells are based on per task 
and casual contracts, while work-experience, training and interim contracts do only 
account for approximately 11% of TC spells. Work-experience and training contracts 
are the ones having longer tenure, while interim, casual and per task are the shortest 
ones. The proportion of TC spells where dedication is part-time is the highest in the 
Medium qualification group (37.31%). Finally, by looking at the first spell, for the High 
qualification group, the most remarkable finding is that the weight of work-experience 
contracts substantially increases and that of interim contracts reduces, while the weight 
of the training contracts increase in the Low group.  
 
As Table 2 shows, most of workers in the High qualification group suffer less than two 
spells of unemployment (50.6%) and three or less TC spells (61.5%). For the remainder 
qualification groups, it is more common to observe workers with a higher number of 
both unemployment and TC spells. For instance, in the Medium (Low) group, 43.8% 
(38.8%) of workers suffer less than two unemployment spells, and 56.3% (52.1%) 
experience three or less TC spells. Moreover, as the number of TC spells increase, it is 
more likely to observe a higher incidence of unemployment spells. Thus, repeated 
temporary contracts frequently imply unemployment spells.  
 
Table 3 shows that at relatively short durations, TCs are more likely to end up into 
unemployment. The likelihood of another TC, though not as large as that of ending up 
in unemployment, is, as well, rather large for short tenure in TC. As duration proceeds, 
the probability of unemployment and that of another TC substantially reduces, while the 
chances of permanent employment increase13. In addition, the length of transitions from 
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 This table shows evidence of some TCs continuing beyond the legal limit of three years. This may be 
attributed either to the fact that there may be imperfect compliance by employers shortly after the three-
year limit, or measurement error (see, in this respect, Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).  
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TC to PC is longer than from TC to TC, and especially from TC to Unemployment. 
This may imply that employers generally use temporary contracts as a probation period 
and that “good” matches (in terms of renewal into PC or TC) last longer. 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows descriptive statistics at the time of the first TC considered. In the 
high and medium qualification groups, workers are predominantly females (60.1% and 
67.0%, respectively), while workers are essentially men in the low qualification group 
(60.3%). The higher the qualification group considered, the older the worker is, 
although on average, differences as regards age are not substantial on average. In 
addition, only around one fifth of workers are initially hired through a Temporary Help 
Agency. 
 
5. Econometric specification 
 
In order to study the hazard rate for both employment and unemployment, we use a 
discrete-time duration model (See Lancaster, 1990, or Jenkins, 1995 for the basic 
features of such models). In general, the hazard rates we will estimate are given by the 
following conditional probability: 
 
 ( ) Pr( | )t T t T tφ = = ≥  (1) 
 
where T is a discrete random variable denoting either employment or unemployment 
duration. Following Bover et al. (2002b) and García-Pérez (1997), we use a logistic 
distribution to model the hazard rates, so that the two conditional exit rates can be 
written as follows: 
 
 0 1( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ))j j jU t F t t x tφ θ θ= +  (2) 
 0 1( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ))k k kE t F t t x tφ γ γ= +  (3) 
 
where x(t) denotes the vector of explanatory variables, some of them varying with  
spell’s duration, t, j is a counter for the two possible exits from unemployment, TC and 
PC, and k is a counter for the exits from a temporary contract (U, TC and PC). 0 ( )j tθ  
and 0 ( )k tγ  represent the additive terms of the duration dependence in the hazard rates 
that we will estimate in the most general way as possible. Finally, 1 ( )j tθ  and 1 ( )k tγ are 
the coefficients for the explanatory factors which in general depend on duration. 
 
As we are considering a competing risk framework, the exit from a given state, 
unemployment or temporary employment, has to be specified as: 
 
 
1
( ) ( )
UJ j
U U
j
t tφ φ
=
= ∑  (4) 
 
1
( ) ( )
EJ j
E E
j
t tφ φ
=
= ∑  (5) 
 
 
Furthermore, in order to avoid the known spurious duration dependence in the hazard 
rate, generated by the presence of unobserved factors, we control for unobserved 
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heterogeneity. Hence, we will estimate the unemployment and employment hazard rates 
simultaneously and assuming that unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete 
distribution function with different mass points (as used in Heckman and Singer, 1984). 
In particular, we consider the case of a two-mass-point distribution function, and we 
estimate the model by maximum likelihood. 
 
The likelihood function considers the three possibilities of censoring present in our data. 
Firstly, unemployment duration may be censored, in which case employment duration is 
not observed. Secondly, we may have a completed unemployment spell and a censored 
employment one. And finally, both unemployment and employment spells may be 
completed ones, that is, not censored. The individual likelihood function with 
unobserved heterogeneity can easily be constructed as follows: 
  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
11
1 1 1
1 11 1
1 1
( ) 1 , 1 , 1 ,
             1 , 1 ,
u u ei i iu u e
i i i i
u ei iu e
i i i i
d d dt t t
i u u u u e
s s s
d dt t
u u u e e e
s s
L s t s s
t s t s
η φ η φ φ η φ η
φ φ η φ φ η
−
−
= = =
− −
− −
= =
   
= − − −   
   
 
− − 
 
∏ ∏ ∏
∏ ∏
 (6) 
 
where tu and te represent unemployment and employment durations, and dui and dei are 
two indicators that allow us to distinguish between censored and completed 
unemployment and employment spells respectively.14 The log-likelihood function with 
unobserved heterogeneity then takes the form: 
 
 
1
ln ln ( ) ( )
N
i
i
L L dFη η
=
= ∑ ∫  (7) 
 
where F(η) is the previously described mass point distribution function.. 
 
6. Results 
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the results obtained from a simultaneous estimation of hazard 
rates for both employment and unemployment durations controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The competing risks hazard model is used to examine the likelihood that 
workers exit temporary employment and (1) enter unemployment; (2) enter a new 
temporary job; (3) enter permanent employment; (4) continue in the current temporary 
job. Simultaneously, we estimate the likelihood that temporary workers who enter 
unemployment exit into (1) a new temporary job; (2) a permanent job; or (3) continue 
unemployed. As explained above, as regards unobserved heterogeneity, we have 
assumed that it can be summarized by a discrete two-mass point distribution function.  
 
Although our dataset does not contain variables related to the individual’s educational 
attainment,15 it does provide information related to the required level of qualification for 
the job (see Table A in the Appendix). Different levels of qualification are expected to 
                                                 
14
 For the ease of the exposition, we are not writing in this expression the specific alternative exits from 
each state. 
15
 The education level is expected to enhance productivity and a worker’s outside options. 
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imply different employment and unemployment prospects for individuals. This will 
affect their outside options and thus their bargaining power on temporary jobs16. We 
thus carry out estimations separately for three sub-samples of individuals, defined 
according to the occupation held (see Section 3). Figures 5.1 (5.2), 6.1 (6.2) and 7.1 
(7.2) show the predicted employment (unemployment) hazard rates, at mean of 
covariates for each qualification group and by controlling for the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
Apart from the explanatory variables described above, we control for the economic 
cycle through the growth rate of employment in the region where 
employment/unemployment takes place and the regional unemployment rate in order to 
account for geographical differences. Moreover, duration-dependence has been taken 
into account through the inclusion of a polynomial in log(t) in the specification of each 
hazard rate. In addition, since Kaplan-Meier estimates for the employment hazard 
indicate that the likelihood of exiting from employment is significantly higher at the 
sixth, twelfth, twenty-fourth and thirty-sixth month17 (see previous section), the 
specification of the employment hazard rate includes dummy variables indicating 
whether or not the individual is on-the-job at such months.  Finally, the specification for 
unobserved heterogeneity is additive in the hazard rate and similar for all possible exits 
except for the one to a permanent contract where we allow for a shifter parameter (θ2 in 
( )U tφ  and γ2 in ( )E tφ ) in order to test whether such heterogeneity is making such exit 
systematically different to the alternative ones. 
 
As regards the transitions out of employment, the dummies describing employment 
durations of 6, 12, 24, and 36 months present a positive and very significant effect on 
the hazard rates, independently of the qualification group considered. As expected, 
therefore, temporary contracts end more likely at such durations than otherwise. As 
regards the transition into permanent employment, these results underlie the fact that 
firms may be converting temporary contracts into permanent ones, once the legal limit 
for the temporary contract has been reached. In addition, as regards unobserved 
heterogeneity, the estimated distribution shows the existence of two different types of 
individuals, one of whom (Type II) has much lower employment hazard rates (see 
Figures 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1, respectively for each qualification group). The effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the exit from TC to a PC is estimated to be much lower 
(the coefficient γ2 is non-significant for the highly skilled and less than 0.5 in the other 
two groups). Hence, such unobserved component is affecting basically the exit to non-
permanent positions. 
 
As shown in Figures 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1 —which reflect the duration dependence of the 
employment hazard rate— the peaks are clearly reflected in the corresponding predicted 
hazards. Moreover, as expected, the predicted hazard at most durations is higher for 
higher qualified workers than for the lowest qualified. However, the spikes at the 36th 
month are relatively more important for the lowest-qualified than for the highest-
qualified ones. The fact that the time pattern of transitions into permanent contracts is 
lower for the lowest-qualified than for the highest-qualified is sensible may be given by 
the fact that the former group tend to occupy more productive job matches, which are 
                                                 
16
 In particular, skilled workers have lower unemployment rates than the less-skilled (see Dolado et al., 
2002). 
17
 Other studies (see, for instance, García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005a) also show evidence in this 
respect. 
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thus more likely to be converted into permanent ones before the legal limit. Moreover, 
one can also think that the lowest-qualified are in a weaker bargaining position than the 
highest-qualified, as they may be more easily replaced. 
 
One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly 
attached to that job, for instance, for contractual reasons. In some sense, this is true, 
since the negative estimated effect for duration dependence is reversed as tenure in the 
temporary job increases. As shown in Figures 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1, the predicted transition 
into regular employment increases after a period of eight months18 (as well as the 
transition into a new temporary job and into unemployment). This effect applies for the 
three sub-groups of workers, including the ones with a relatively weak labor market 
position (the lowest-qualified). This result implies that the probability of ending as 
unemployed, of receiving another temporary contract or of finding a permanent contract 
decreases during the initial months of temporary employment, but increases thereafter. 
Thus, in relation to permanent employment, temporary employment initially presents a 
temporary penalty effect, since this negative impact disappears for long enough duration 
in employment. A likely interpretation for this result is that sufficiently long 
experiences of employment increase worker’s human capital, and this fact may help 
him/her to find a permanent job (compared to workers whose tenure in temporary 
employment is shorter). Apparently, employers may prefer individuals who have 
occupied a temporary job for enough time, given that this may constitute a positive 
signal. An increasing size of the social network among temporarily employed workers 
may also explain this. In addition, as the temp contract goes on, given its fixed-term 
nature, the worker may increase search intensity. This may also explain the observed 
positive effect on the job finding rate.  
 
Finally, with regard to the transition from TC to PC, note how the hazard rate is rather 
stable even during the first months of tenure. Thus, most workers are transferred to 
permanent jobs at peak months. That is, when there is no other way to hold them. This 
establishes a difference with respect to the transitions from a temporary contract to 
another temporary contract: these transitions are also larger at the first months, but then 
they decline and eventually increase as duration lengthens (especially for the Type I-
worker).  
 
As regards the transitions out of unemployment (last four columns in Tables 5, 6 and 7) 
the probability of either finding a temporary or a permanent contract declines with 
unemployment duration. Note how the likelihood of permanent (or even temporary) 
employment substantially reduces during the first months in unemployment (Figures 
5.2, 6.2 and 7.2). These results are consistent with Kaplan-Meier estimates commented-
on above. However, contrary to duration-dependence for employment transitions, this 
negative effect of duration dependence is not reversed19. This implies that time spent in 
unemployment presents a strong negative impact on the likelihood of re-entering into 
employment (either through a temporary or a permanent employment). Thus, the more 
time goes by, the higher the locking-in effect of unemployment, since the latter causes 
the transition rate into regular work to be lower as time passes. We interpret this result 
in light of human capital theory: an unemployment spell not only precludes the 
accumulation of work experience, but may also bring about the deterioration of general 
skills (Gregory et al., 2001) and an individual’s psychological well being (Goldsmith et. 
                                                 
18
 A similar finding is obtained by Zijl et al., 2004, pp. 14. 
19
 The only exception is the transition into a temporary contract for the Low qualification group. 
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al, 1996, 1997)20. Note also that from unemployment, the rate into temporary work is 
much larger than the rate into permanent work. This fact, together with the fact that the 
rate of flowing into regular employment in succession to a temporary job is similarly 
quite low, provides evidence on the non-existence of a stepping-stone effect. 
 
As regards the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, for transitions out of 
unemployment, the estimated distribution function shows the existence of two different 
types of workers, one of whom (Type II) has lower unemployment hazard rates. The 
estimated model allows for a differential effect of such unobserved heterogeneity over 
the exit from unemployment to a TC or to a PC. We find that this effect is significantly 
larger than 1 for the High qualification group, and lower than 1 in the other two groups. 
Hence, the difference between the two types is larger in the exit to a permanent job for 
those highly qualified (Type II individuals have a substantially low exit probability 
from unemployment, especially to a permanent job). In the other two qualification 
groups, the exit to a PC is almost the same for the two types of workers. 
 
It is important to note that individual background previous to current TC spell is 
relevant for explaining the transitions across labor careers. In particular, the chance of 
transiting into a permanent job (independently of whether the point of departure is either 
a TC or an unemployment spell) reduces as the number of previous contracts is larger. 
On the contrary, a higher number of previous temporary contracts helps the worker to 
find another temporary contract. Thus, moving from one TC to another TC is relatively 
easy but moving to a PC is more difficult the larger is the number of temporary 
contracts. Hence, the recurrent use of temporary employment has a substantial 
detrimental effect, since it deteriorates employment prospects in terms of the likelihood 
of exiting out of temporary employment.  Moreover, even though a worker has a chance 
of moving from TC to PC and this chance increases with the time spent in a temporary 
job (as shown in previous Figures), for those who fail the probability of being promoted 
decreases with the next TC contracts. This reduction is due not only to repeated TC 
experiences, but also to interruptions in-between (which particularly penalize the 
transition into a stable job). 
 
As expected, the time spent previously in unemployment has a negative effect in order 
to find a temporary job (and a non-significant effect in order to find a permanent job). 
However, it has a positive effect in order to become unemployed again. This result is 
reasonable to the extent that —since productivity is imperfectly observable— the 
likelihood of exiting from unemployment towards a temporary job will be lower if the 
employer takes a past history of unemployment as signalling low productivity. On the 
contrary, the larger tenure in the previous job is, the larger is the likelihood of exiting 
out of a TC into a PC (though only for the high qualification group), and the lower is the 
likelihood of moving into a TC or into unemployment. Thus, previous employment 
experience helps workers attain regular employment in case of high-qualified workers, 
independently of current tenure in the temporary job. This finding is consistent with 
dual labor market theory since skills (captured by tenure at the job) have a negative 
effect on the propensity to be employed in the secondary market (temporary job) 
relative to the primary market (permanent job). A 1-unit increase in tenure slightly 
increases by 1.6% the individual’s likelihood of being permanently employed versus 
continuing under a temporary contract for the High qualification group. Moreover, 
                                                 
20
 Excellent analyses on the relationship between psychological capital and wages can be found in 
Goldsmith et al., 1995, 1996 and 1997). 
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during a spell of unemployment, the longer previous tenure is, the higher is the 
likelihood of re-entering into employment (either a TC or a PC). A possible 
interpretation of this result is that employers are likely to regard previous long 
employment experiences as positive signals in order to screen individuals for permanent 
positions or to hire unemployed individuals under a temporary contract. 
 
The type of temporary contract held in the TC spell is another relevant determinant of 
the transitions. Having a casual —for the high qualification group— and an interim 
contract —for the medium and low qualification groups— increases the probability of 
achieving a permanent contract. On the other extreme, per-task contracts present a 
detrimental effect on the movement into regular employment (though this negative 
impact is non-significant for the High qualification group). As regards individuals who 
are currently unemployed, a previous job under a work-experience contract helps them 
enter into a permanent job (independently of the qualification group considered). 
Casual contracts also present a positive impact in the transition into regular 
employment (although being marginally significant for individuals belonging to the 
High qualification group). Finally, individuals on part-time work have non-significantly 
different transition rates into regular work than workers on full-time work21.  
 
As regards demographic variables, for a male temporary worker the probability of 
achieving a permanent contract does not significantly differ from women in the High 
qualification group, while they are in a disadvantaged position (relative to women) in 
the two remainder groups. Age has a positive effect on the likelihood of transiting from 
TC to another job (either another TC or a PC), and a significant negative effect on the 
likelihood of entering into unemployment in the highest qualification group. As regards 
transitions from the unemployment state, age also exerts a positive impact (when 
significant) into another employment (under either a TC or a PC). These results for age 
are most probably related to the fact that older workers have more firm-specific human 
capital, which is highly valued by employers. In addition, it is a fact that younger 
workers are more willing to move from jobs (and employers) for improving their job 
match, even though this may imply an experience of unemployment, and eventually 
settling in a more stable career path (Jensen et al., 1999). 
 
We find also that, out of a TC spell, the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the 
transitions into a PC. This may be attributed to the fact that when the unemployment 
rate is high, firms might keep on searching for better employees and so the probabilities 
that a worker is renewed or converted into a permanent job are lower. A lower 
unemployment rate implies better outside opportunities for temporary workers in search 
for better jobs. It enables them to more credibly threat their employer in case of low 
conversion rates. The unemployment rate also inflicts a negative impact as regards the 
exit from unemployment into a new job. On the contrary, the growth employment rate 
exhibits the opposite impact to that associated with the unemployment rate, both on the 
hazard out of a TC and on the hazard out of unemployment  
 
Finally, the worker’s Unemployment Benefits status is included in the estimation of the 
exit from unemployment as a dummy that indicated whether or not the individual 
receives contributory benefits. This dummy obtains the expected negative sign, for any 
                                                 
21
 Other studies have found that full-time employment has a positive effect on the likelihood that 
temporary workers become employed on a permanent basis. See, for instance, Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), 
pp. 323. 
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qualification group considered. In addition, results show a large and statistically 
significant increase in permanent employment probabilities after 1997. This trend exists 
for both periods: 1997-2000 and 2001-2003. However, the trend is stronger for the 
former period and then, in spite of continuing positive and significantly different from 
zero, reduces from 2001 onwards. These findings are consistent with the evidence 
provided on permanent conversion rates in previous studies in Spain22. Thus, we can 
conclude that the reforms have basically strengthened the incentives to permanent 
conversions of temporary contracts. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions  
 
In this paper, we have investigated the transition from unemployment and temporary 
work to more stable positions. Our focus has been especially placed on the role of the 
sequence of temporary contracts on the probability of moving from temporary into 
permanent employment.  
 
For this purpose, we have applied multiple-spell duration techniques to a longitudinal 
data set of temporary workers obtained from Social Security records for the period 
1996-2003. The dataset contains multiple spells in labor market states for three different 
qualification groups of individuals. Our results show that, even though transitions into 
permanent employment increase with tenure, temporary jobs do not constitute stepping 
stones towards permanent employment, especially the larger the number of accumulated 
temporary contracts is, since the probability of obtaining a permanent job decreases 
with repeated temporary jobs. Moreover, the empirical evidence in this paper shows that 
the conversion rate from temporary to permanent employment is very low in Spain. In 
fact, having obtained a temporary job means that the transition rate into permanent work 
is not higher than the one from unemployment. Moreover, our results also show that 
individuals with high duration of unemployment flow into permanent work less 
frequently. 
 
Our analysis, apart from the academic interest, becomes relevant from a policy 
perspective. Although the Spanish government has subsidized since 1997 the 
conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones, it seems that such a decision is 
not being currently adopted more widely than before (see García Pérez and Rebollo, 
2007, for an evaluation of such a policy). Hence, it seems that in order for firms to hire 
workers on a permanent basis, apparently something else (apart from reducing the cost 
associated with the hiring permanent workers) is needed: one potential policy measure 
would consist of addressing more directly workers’ productivity at the firm.  
                                                 
22
 Kugler et al. (2003) show that the 1997 reform led to a sharp and sustained increase in the number of 
permanent contracts for workers in some affected groups. And the 2001 reform, which became effective 
in January 2001, essentially extended de 1997 reform, but applied lower subsidies for some contracts 
signed in 1999.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A 
Occupation category groups 
Category Description:Social Security Contribution Category  
High 1- ingenieros and licenciados - engineers and graduates 
2- ingenieros técnicos, peritos and ayudantes titulados - technical 
engineers and other skilled workers 
3- jefes administrativos and de taller - chief and departmental heads 
4 - ayudantes no titulados - other semi-skilled workers 
5 - oficiales administrativos - skilled clerks 
6 - subalternos - auxiliary workers 
Intermediate 7 - auxiliares administrativos - semi-skilled clerks 
8 - oficiales de primera and segunda - skilled laborers 
Low 9 - oficiales de tercera and especialistas - semi-skilled laborers 
10 - peones - unskilled laborers 
 
 
Table B 
Description of Work Contract Denominations Used in the Analysis 
 
Work Contract Name Description 
Work-Experience 
(Practice) Contract 
(Contrato de prácticas) 
The purpose of this contract is to enable persons who have 
completed secondary, vocational training or university education 
to gain work experience according to their educational level. 
Training Contract 
(Contrato de formación) 
This contract is related to the provision of theoretical and 
practical knowledge required to perform a skilled job. This 
contract replaced the old apprenticeship contract in 1997. 
Interim Contract 
(Contrato de interinidad) 
This temporary contract is related to interim situations in the firm 
Per-task Contract 
(Contrato de obra o 
servicio) 
This contract was introduced for temporary needs of the firms 
related to specific works or services of unknown duration (but 
presumably not permanent). 
Casual Contract 
(Contrato eventual por 
circunstancias de la 
producción) 
This contract is related to unusual or seasonal circumstances of 
the goods markets and excess of work in the firm. 
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Table 1. TC spells composition 
 
 n. of spells % Mean length % in first spell 
HIGH QUAL.  
Type of contract     
Work-experience 1,042 7.72 12.241 (11.103) 17.05 
Training 83 0.61 10.072 (8.531) 0.06 
Interim 2,125 15.74 3.395 (2.544) 9.74 
Per task 3,513 26.02 6.083 (4.279) 21.00 
Casual 4,038 29.91 3.637 (3.359) 24.96 
Other 2,698 19.99 11.709 (6.119) 27.18 
Dedication     
Part-time  4,485 33.22 4.252 (3.684) 35.89 
Full-time 9,014 66.78 5.541 (4.329) 64.11 
MEDIUM QUAL.  
Type of contract     
Work-experience 905 3.62 10.940 (10.021) 4.87 
Training 289 1.16 10.806 (9.987) 0.02 
Interim 2,006 8.03 3.152 (2.382) 4.37 
Per task 6,744 26.99 5.068 (2.931) 21.22 
Casual 9,931 39.74 3.576 (3.583) 39.19 
Other 5,112 20.46 11.152 (5.649) 30.35 
Dedication     
Part-time  9,322 37.31 3.827 (3.259) 44.86 
Full-time 15,665 62.69 4.617 (3.829) 55.14 
LOW QUAL.  
Type of contract     
Work-experience 980 1.81 10.947 (9.959) 1.63 
Training 3,849 7.12 11.436 (10.781) 20.62 
Interim 2,579 4.77 2.981 (2.255) 1.88 
Per task 17,186 31.81 5.098 (3.700) 22.48 
Casual 21,133 39.11 3.677 (3.394) 31.29 
Other 8,302 15.37 11.004 (5.727) 22.10 
Dedication     
Part-time  14,151 26.19 3.770 (3.271) 29.02 
Full-time 39,878 73.81 5.131 (4.294) 70.98 
 
Note: sample size is 3366 individuals for the High Qual. group, 5816 for the Medium Qual. 
group and 11,776 for the Low group. All individuals are between 16 and 25 years-old in 1996 
and their first spell is temporary. “Median length” measured in months, in parentheses for 
complete spells only. 
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Table 2. Number of individuals by TC and non-employment experiences (%) 
 
Number 
of TC 
spells 
Number of Unemployment spells   
 HIGH QUAL.  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >9 Total 
1 17.3% 7.6% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 26.6% 
2 6.8% 8.9% 4.8% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.2% 
3 2.1% 3.8% 5.3% 2.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.7% 
4 0.7% 1.5% 3.2% 3.4% 1.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 
5 0.3% 0.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1.4% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 
6 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 1.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
7 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.9% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 
9 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 1.9% 
>9 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.9% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 2.1% 7.8% 
Total 27.4% 23.2% 18.2% 10.5% 6.7% 4.9% 3.4% 1.9% 1.0% 0.8% 2.1% 3366 
 MEDIUM QUAL. 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >9 Total 
1 12.0% 8.3% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 22.1% 
2 4.1% 9.0% 5.8% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 19.9% 
3 1.7% 3.9% 5.4% 2.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
4 0.7% 1.9% 3.0% 3.4% 1.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.8% 
5 0.3% 0.8% 1.5% 2.3% 2.1% 1.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 
6 0.1% 0.4% 0.9% 1.7% 1.4% 1.3% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 
7 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 1.2% 0.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 
8 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 2.4% 
>9 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 2.7% 8.4% 
Total 19.1% 24.7% 19.3% 12.9% 7.6% 5.5% 3.7% 2.2% 1.3% 1.0% 2.7% 5816 
 LOW QUAL. 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >9 Total 
1 11.8% 6.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 19.6% 
2 3.6% 8.3% 5.3% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.0% 
3 1.3% 3.7% 6.0% 3.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.5% 
4 0.5% 1.8% 3.2% 3.7% 1.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 
5 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4% 2.3% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.5% 
6 0.1% 0.5% 0.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1.5% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.6% 
7 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
8 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 2.6% 
>9 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.5% 1.1% 2.8% 10.4% 
Total 17.5% 21.3% 19.6% 13.5% 9.2% 6.3% 3.9% 2.6% 2.0% 1.2% 2.8% 11776 
 
Source: Social Security Records and authors’ own elaboration.
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Table 3. Length of spell by type of transition  
 
HIGH QUAL. 
Months: TC-TC TC-PC TC-Unemp. Unemp.-TC Unemp.-PC 
 n. % n. % n. % n. % n. % 
0-6 543 69.35 122 37.54 1589 84.07 967 63.37 122 59.22 
7-12 131 16.73 81 24.92 227 12.01 335 21.95 36 17.48 
13-18 47 6.00 37 11.38 36 1.90 123 8.06 25 12.14 
19-24 42 5.36 62 19.08 30 1.59 64 4.19 10 4.85 
25-30 11 1.40 9 3.69 4 0.21 37 2.42 13 6.31 
31-36 6 0.77 2 2.77 2 0.11 - - - - 
>36 3 0.38 - 0.62 2 0.11 - - - - 
Total: 783  325  1890  1526  206  
Censored: 368 158 
MEDIUM QUAL. 
Months: TC-TC TC-PC TC- Unemp. Unemp.-TC Unemp.-PC 
 n. % n. % n. % n. % n. % 
0-6 964       79.74       234 51.54 3386 88.62 1886 61.29 251 61.37 
7-12 154       12.74       115 25.33 292 7.64 746 24.24 69 16.87 
13-18 42 3.47 49 10.79 71 1.86 220 7.15 54 13.20 
19-24 35 2.89 32 7.05 47 1.23 155 5.04 18 4.40 
25-30 5 0.41 11 2.42 11 0.29 70 2.27 17 4.16 
31-36 6 0.50 11 2.42 8 0.21 -- -- -- -- 
>36 3 0.25 2 0.44 6 0.16 -- -- -- -- 
Total: 1209  454  3821  3077  409  
Censored: 332 335 
LOW QUAL. 
Months: TC-TC TC-PC TC- Unemp. Unemp.-TC Unemp.-PC 
 n. % n. % n. % n. % n. % 
0-6 1766 71.32       289 37.88 6635 85.29   3,737 57.57 371 57.88 
7-12 336 13.57    159 20.84 642 8.25   1,646 25.36 125 19.50 
13-18 141 5.69    69 9.04 294 3.78   541 8.33 61 9.52 
19-24 159 6.42    180 23.59 147 1.89   373 5.75 54 8.42 
25-30 30 1.21    12 1.57 25 0.32   194 2.99 30 4.68 
31-36 38 1.53    51 6.68 33 0.42   -- -- - - 
>36 6 0.24    3 0.39 3 0.04   -- -- -- - 
Total: 2476  763  7779  6,491  641  
Censored: 758 647 
 
Source: Social Security Records and authors’ own elaboration.
 22 
Table 4. Main descriptive statistics for the first TC spell  
 
 
Variable High Qual. Medium Qual. Low Qual. 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Age 21.978 (2.406) 20.975 (2.427) 19.466 (2.315) 
Equal Employer 0.342  0.334  0.247  
Gender (=1 if male) 0.399  0.330  0.603  
Temporary Help Agency 0.235  0.174  0.209  
Qualification       
Upper-High Qual. 0.376  0.000  0.000  
Lower-High Qual 0.624  0.000  0.000  
Medium Qual. 0.000  1.000  0.000  
Low Qual. 0.000  0.000  1.000  
Type of contract       
Work-exper. Contract 0.171  0.049  0.016  
Training contract 0.001  0.000  0.206  
Interim contract 0.097  0.044  0.019  
Per task contract 0.210  0.212  0.225  
Casual contract 0.250  0.392  0.313  
Other contract 0.272  0.303  0.221  
Part-time 0.359  0.449  0.290  
Number of observations 3366 5816 11766 
 
Note: Upper-High qualification collects social security contribution groups 
1, 2 and 3; Lower-High qualification collects social security contribution 
groups 4, 5 and 6 (see Appendix A).  
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Figure 1.1. Transitions from the first TC. High Qualification 
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Figure 1.2. Transitions from the first TC. Medium Qualification 
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Figure 1.3. Transitions from the first TC. Low Qualification 
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Table 6. Regression estimates. High Qualification group 
 TC-Unemployment TC-TC TC-PC Unempl-TC Unempl-PC 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Log(t) 
-1.223 -26.51 -1.582 -27.85 -0.657 -5.88 -0.487 -8.82 -0.685 -4.89 
Log(t)2 0.197 11.14 0.347 16.78 0.234 6.94 0.058 2.79 0.170 3.62 
No. Previous contracts 
-0.015 -3.72 0.048 14.74 -0.002 -0.15 0.079 7.31 -0.092 -3.28 
Previous Unemp. Dur. 0.019 6.21 -0.017 -3.58 -0.010 -1.17 -0.018 -4.13 -0.023 -2.13 
Previous Emp. Dur. 
-0.037 -9.24 -0.020 -4.38 0.016 2.71 0.025 4.74 0.050 4.75 
Unemploym. Benefits - - - - - - 
-1.170 -12.56 -1.176 -4.94 
Unemp. Benefits*Log(t) - - - - - - 0.358 4.16 0.545 2.77 
Age 
-0.176 -2.39 0.185 2.04 0.603 3.14 0.119 1.4 0.556 2.39 
Age2 0.001 0.82 -0.006 -3 -0.012 -3.02 -0.002 -1.04 -0.010 -1.94 
Unemp. Rate 0.000 0.1 -0.004 -1.11 -0.057 -7.82 -0.021 -4.61 -0.057 -5.53 
∆ Empl. Rate 
-0.903 -1.15 -0.589 -0.61 2.057 1.24 -0.080 -0.09 4.520 2.01 
Equal employer 
-0.055 -1.72 0.293 7.83 0.997 14.93 0.916 22.81 0.230 2.04 
Sex 
-0.146 -3.93 -0.143 -3.24 0.090 1.36 -0.099 -2.4 0.046 0.5 
THA 0.365 9.46 0.477 10.72 -0.450 -4.56 0.095 2.32 -0.387 -3.38 
High Qual. - - - - - - - - - - 
Med-High Qual. 0.433 10.17 0.135 2.63 0.275 3.26 -0.122 -2.49 -0.122 -1.04 
Med.-Low Qual. 0.361 6.78 0.399 6.66 0.675 6.57 0.134 2.14 0.283 1.88 
Low Qual. 0.513 8.6 0.591 8.62 0.465 3.51 0.233 3.38 0.257 1.5 
Period 6 1.006 17.14 1.105 14.71 1.267 12.4 - - - - 
Period 12 1.467 15.3 1.631 15.22 1.636 13.55 - - - - 
Period 24 1.599 8.37 2.004 11.5 2.165 12.41 - - - - 
Period 36 1.054 2.9 0.820 2.01 1.044 2.37 - - - - 
Years 1997-2000 
-0.088 -1.02 0.361 2.74 1.590 2.72 0.544 4.16 0.907 1.53 
years 2001-2003 
-0.292 -3.1 0.066 0.47 1.155 1.96 0.702 5.06 1.395 2.33 
Work-exper. Contract 
-1.198 -14.63 -0.673 -7.75 0.290 2.03 0.046 0.43 0.847 4.12 
Training contract 
-1.211 -6.15 -1.284 -4.89 0.228 0.63 0.445 1.89 -0.058 -0.08 
Casual contract 0.369 6.73 0.202 3.04 0.639 4.69 0.139 2.16 0.269 1.67 
Per task contract 0.150 2.8 -0.227 -3.47 -0.158 -1.15 0.119 1.85 0.010 0.06 
Interim contract 0.528 8.24 0.366 5.04 0.065 0.36 0.262 3.45 0.008 0.04 
Other - - - - - - - - - - 
Part-Time 0.192 4.51 0.115 2.24 -0.114 -1.06 -0.018 -0.34 0.068 0.53 
Constant 2.229 2.63 -3.190 -3 -12.667 -5.48 -3.567 -3.68 -11.457 -4.24 
Prob. Type I 0.618 35.392     0.764 24.983   
Cons. Type I -0.462 -4.003     -0.222 -6.558   
Prob. Type II 0.382 -     0.236 -   
Cons. Type II 0.747 -     0.719 -   
θ2 / γ2     0.159 0.9   1.129 3.34 
No. Observations 97038          
Log Likelihood -51879.13          
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Table 7. Regression estimates. Medium Qualification group 
 TC-Unemployment TC-TC TC-PC Unempl-TC Unempl-PC 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Log(t) 
-1.441 -42.44 -1.502 -34.58 -0.413 -4.86 -0.643 -17.8 -0.712 -7.76 
Log(t)2 0.241 18.13 0.310 18.94 0.168 6.36 0.105 8.09 0.121 3.91 
No. Previous contracts 
-0.010 -3.37 0.033 12 -0.004 -0.46 0.070 10.91 -0.015 -1.03 
Previous Unemp. Dur. 0.024 11.45 -0.008 -2.38 -0.009 -1.52 -0.010 -4 -0.017 -2.73 
Previous Emp. Dur. 
-0.049 -14.77 -0.017 -4.62 0.004 0.84 0.024 5.85 0.056 7.99 
Unemploym. Benefits - - - - - - 
-1.356 -19.25 -0.925 -5.98 
Unemp. Benefits*Log(t) - - - - - - 0.403 6.37 0.153 1.08 
Age 
-0.003 -0.05 0.417 5.63 0.657 4.82 -0.016 -0.26 0.488 3.17 
Age2 
-0.002 -1.57 -0.010 -6.22 -0.014 -4.59 0.001 0.94 -0.009 -2.56 
Unemp. Rate 
-0.003 -1.14 -0.006 -2.16 -0.043 -8.29 -0.011 -4.14 -0.051 -7.71 
∆ Empl. Rate 1.313 2.36 0.787 1.1 6.258 4.97 -0.063 -0.1 4.253 2.88 
Equal employer 
-0.094 -4.15 0.251 9.03 0.923 18.55 0.979 34.76 0.214 2.84 
Sex 
-0.109 -4.16 -0.179 -5.43 -0.138 -2.63 -0.088 -2.98 0.097 1.58 
THA 0.548 19.31 0.730 21.63 0.127 1.7 0.147 4.77 -0.357 -4.25 
High Qual. 
-0.648 -9.45 -0.446 -6.03 -0.248 -2.1 0.182 2.16 -0.131 -0.67 
Med-High Qual. 
-0.206 -5.01 -0.034 -0.72 -0.057 -0.73 0.165 3.38 0.129 1.19 
Med.-Low Qual. - - - - - - - - - - 
Low Qual. 0.073 2.33 0.219 5.72 -0.028 -0.38 0.200 5.68 0.065 0.77 
Period 6 1.194 27.54 1.391 26.3 1.427 19.73 - - - - 
Period 12 1.621 22.78 1.644 19.4 1.699 18.02 - - - - 
Period 24 1.818 12.28 1.547 8.55 1.973 11.84 - - - - 
Period 36 0.070 0.15 0.038 0.07 1.169 3.19 - - - - 
Years 1997-2000 
-0.094 -1.51 0.488 4.56 0.856 2.65 0.595 6.25 1.682 2.88 
years 2001-2003 
-0.166 -2.45 0.338 3.04 0.650 1.99 0.747 7.45 2.202 3.76 
Work-exper. Contract 
-1.318 -17.37 -0.760 -9.19 -0.100 -0.81 0.283 2.93 0.881 5.12 
Training contract 
-1.433 -12.94 -1.383 -9.29 0.144 0.72 0.318 2.46 0.369 1.21 
Casual contract 0.115 2.78 0.006 0.11 0.486 4.89 0.091 1.95 0.188 1.69 
Per task contract 
-0.075 -1.76 -0.293 -5.38 -0.412 -3.83 0.109 2.25 -0.064 -0.53 
Interim contract 0.143 2.46 0.186 2.7 0.384 2.89 0.310 4.69 0.157 0.94 
Other - - - - - - - - - - 
Part-Time 0.099 3.12 -0.010 -0.25 -0.118 -1.51 0.013 0.36 -0.131 -1.57 
Constant 0.823 1.3 -5.833 -7.02 -12.329 -7.82 -2.445 -3.5 -11.087 -6.13 
Prob. Type I 0.672 17.251     0.860 63.856   
Cons. Type I -0.458 -8.081     -0.141 -9.452   
Prob. Type II 0.328 -     0.140 -   
Cons. Type II 0.940 -     0.863 -   
θ2 / γ2     0.380 3.17   0.367 1.84 
No. Observations 170276          
Log Likelihood -97530.145          
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Table 8. Regression estimates. Low Qualification group 
 TC-Unemployment TC-TC TC-PC Unempl-TC Unempl-PC 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Log(t) 
-1.284 -57.17 -1.462 -50.45 -0.483 -7.47 -0.768 -31.69 -0.816 -12.5 
Log(t)2 0.224 25.94 0.334 31.55 0.209 10.46 0.164 18.6 0.171 7.65 
No. Previous contracts 
-0.004 -1.76 0.043 17.37 0.021 3.79 0.065 12.04 -0.007 -0.67 
Previous Unemp. Dur. 0.018 13.53 -0.017 -8.08 -0.006 -1.61 -0.007 -4.45 -0.010 -2.47 
Previous Emp. Dur. 
-0.047 -25.2 -0.020 -9.57 0.004 1.17 0.026 11.28 0.050 11.7 
Unemploym. Benefits - - - - - - 
-1.363 -30.48 -1.421 -11.45 
Unemp. Benefits*Log(t) - - - - - - 0.336 8.21 0.567 5.61 
Age 0.025 0.72 0.280 6.09 0.275 3.21 0.144 3.29 0.355 3.37 
Age2 
-0.002 -2.71 -0.008 -7.12 -0.006 -3.16 -0.002 -2.38 -0.006 -2.44 
Unemp. Rate 
-0.002 -1.17 -0.008 -4.32 -0.062 -15.3 -0.017 -9.2 -0.070 -14.27 
∆ Empl. Rate 
-0.035 -0.09 2.051 4.22 1.897 1.96 0.547 1.32 1.485 1.38 
Equal employer 
-0.148 -9.24 0.143 7.26 0.989 25.11 0.926 46.83 0.387 7.1 
Sex 
-0.156 -9 0.050 2.33 -0.067 -1.77 0.113 5.55 0.045 1.04 
THA 0.834 44.4 1.206 55.02 0.152 2.51 0.134 6.76 -0.419 -7.19 
High Qual. 
-0.612 -9.37 -0.381 -5.28 -0.018 -0.13 0.116 1.45 0.044 0.24 
Med-High Qual. 
-0.260 -7.84 -0.328 -7.95 0.237 3.32 0.117 2.98 -0.007 -0.07 
Med.-Low Qual. 
-0.161 -7.73 -0.021 -0.85 0.298 6.25 0.112 4.53 0.173 2.99 
Low Qual. - - - - - - - - - - 
Period 6 1.224 44.84 1.316 36.66 1.411 25.55 - - - - 
Period 12 1.529 34.36 1.705 32.58 1.612 22.5 - - - - 
Period 24 1.888 20.25 2.235 23.85 3.031 33.16 - - - - 
Period 36 1.609 8.79 1.584 8.35 2.507 14.15 - - - - 
Years 1997-2000 
-0.186 -4.35 0.396 5.45 0.486 2.17 0.548 8.21 0.852 2.89 
years 2001-2003 
-0.393 -8.54 0.219 2.89 0.229 1.01 0.815 11.65 1.356 4.57 
Work-exper. Contract 
-1.093 -16.54 -0.866 -11.6 -0.508 -4.34 0.349 4.13 0.531 3.01 
Training contract 
-1.262 -31.27 -1.334 -24.89 -0.001 -0.01 0.093 1.97 0.393 3.47 
Casual contract 0.257 8.43 0.027 0.69 0.431 5.46 0.132 3.73 0.145 1.71 
Per task contract 0.101 3.2 -0.315 -7.89 -0.825 -9.42 0.210 5.78 -0.141 -1.55 
Interim contract 0.302 6.45 0.324 6.04 0.293 2.55 0.207 3.84 -0.049 -0.35 
Other - - - - - - - - - - 
Part-Time 0.164 6.82 0.158 5.14 0.077 1.21 -0.071 -2.47 -0.044 -0.67 
Constant 0.165 0.43 -4.420 -8.79 -7.348 -7.63 -4.103 -8.62 -8.513 -7.22 
Prob. Type I 0.582 25.568     0.794 52.755   
Cons. Type I -0.451 -16.697     -0.221 -12.994   
Prob. Type II 0.418 -     0.206 -   
Cons. Type II 0.626 -     0.851 -   
θ2 / γ2     0.223 2.15   0.438 3.83 
No. Observations 397867          
Log Likelihood -215498.1          
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Figure 2.1.Empirical hazard rate from TC. Kaplan Meier estimates. High 
Qualification group 
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Figure 2.2. Empirical hazard rate from Unemployment. Kaplan Meier estimates. 
High Qualification Group 
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Figure 3.1.Empirical hazard rate from TC. Kaplan Meier estimates. Medium 
Qualification group 
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Figure 3.2. Empirical hazard rate from Unemployment. Kaplan Meier estimates. 
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Figure 4.1.Empirical hazard rate from TC. Kaplan Meier estimates. Low 
Qualification group 
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Figure 4.2. Empirical hazard rate from Unemployment. Kaplan Meier estimates. 
Low Group 
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Figure 5.1. Predicted hazard from TC by type of individuals. High qualification 
group 
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Figure 6.1. Predicted hazard from employment by type of individuals. Medium 
qualification group 
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Figure 6.2. Predicted hazard from unemployment by type of individuals. Medium 
qualification group 
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Figure 7.1. Predicted hazard from employment by type of individuals. Low 
qualification group 
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Figure 7.2. Predicted hazard from unemployment by type of individuals. Low 
qualification group 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
Duration in months
Type I U-TC Type I U-PC
Type II U-TC Type II U-PC
 
 
